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COMMENT
LUCIDITY SINKS AS THESE TWAIN
CONVERGE: KEEPING PICKERING AFLOAT
DESPITE LOCURTO V. GIULIANI AND
MELZER V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
MARY K. McCANNt
INTRODUCTION
Although the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech is
a fundamental right granted to every citizen,1 it is not free from
limitations. 2 One such limitation has to do with the free speech
rights of government employees. 3  When public employees
t J.D. Candidate, June 2005, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2002,
State University of New York at Binghamton. Thank you to Thomas Hardy who
wrote the poem 'The Convergence of the Twain" about the sinking of the Titanic.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech"). The First Amendment grants every citizen the right to speak publicly on
controversial issues in order to furnish a public and open debate. See Stephen
Allred, Note, Connick v. Myers: Narrowing the Free Speech Right of Public
Employees, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 429, 429 (1984) (emphasizing the danger that
results from suppressing speech that should be heard). A citizen's right to criticize
the government facilitates this type of debate. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964) (stating that the suppression of good faith criticism of the
government is unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
2 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (holding that a person
cannot be punished merely for advocating certain unpopular actions, but can be
punished for acting unlawfully); Allred, supra note 1, at 429 (stating that the
United States Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment's grant of free
speech is not absolute). These limitations include those who knowingly or recklessly
make false statements, publish obscenity, or make false advertising claims. See Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at
279-80; see also Allred, supra note 1, at 429. Justice Holmes recognized that the
First Amendment does not protect one who falsely shouts fire in a crowded theater.
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
3 See Allred, supra note 1, at 429-30 (stating that there are limitations imposed
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express views that are detrimental to the community's safety, 4
they undermine the government's effectiveness in rendering
services to society.5  In turn, when the government cannot
perform its tasks effectively due to an employee's speech, it has a
right to terminate that employee. 6 With this in mind, courts
must formulate a workable test to determine whether a
government employee's speech is protected by the Constitution.
7
upon First Amendment rights of public employees, especially when that speech is
critical of their employer); Karin B. Hoppmann, Note, Concern with Public Concern:
Toward a Better Definition of the Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 993, 994-95 (1997) (discussing a public employee's "split personality" as a
citizen of the United States and a government employee who does not have an
absolute right of free speech); Victoria K. Johnson, Note, Ferrara v. Mills: The A, B,
C's of the Public Educator's Freedom of Expression, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. 181, 181
(1987) (discussing the traditional limitations on a public educator's right to criticize
her employers).
4 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390-92 (1987) (stating that public
officials who are responsible for actual law enforcement should be limited in their
speech more than other public employees in certain situations); Pappas v. Giuliani,
290 F.3d 143, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a police officer who disseminates
racist views undermines community cooperation with law enforcement agencies);
Andr6 G. Travieso, Note, Employee Free Speech Rights in the Workplace: Balancing
the First Amendment Against Racist Speech by Police Officers, 51 RUTGERS L. REV.
1377, 1377-78 (1999) (discussing the dangerous effects of employing racist police
officers).
5 See Pappas, 290 F.3d at 146-47 (stating that governmental effectiveness is
undermined when police departments' racist views cause communities to lose trust
in them); see also Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388-89 (holding that if a member of a
constable's office had spoken to the general public, his statements would undermine
the effectiveness of that office). Rankin suggested that under a different factual
setting, the case would have turned out very differently. It implicitly decided that
the potential dangerous consequences resulting from an employee's speech is an
important aspect of government effectiveness, especially in a department where the
key objective is to protect the public. See id. at 390-92.
6 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (stating that when an
employee's speech has a negative impact on the effectiveness of the government in
performing its services, it has the right to terminate that employee). Many courts
have applied the standard set forth in Pickering and have held that the government
has the right to terminate employees in certain situations. See, e.g., Pappas, 290
F.3d at 146-48; Porter v. Dawson Educ. Serv. Coop., 150 F.3d 887, 894-95 (8th Cir.
1998); Bryson v. Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1563-64 (11th Cir. 1989); May v.
Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 787 F.2d 1105, 1108-09 (7th Cir. 1986);
Anderson v. Evans, 660 F.2d 153, 158 (6th Cir. 1981).
7 See Charles W. Hemingway, A Closer Look at Waters v. Churchill and United
States v. National Treasury Employees Union: Constitutional Tensions Between the
Government as Employer and the Citizen as Federal Employee, 44 AM. U. L. REV.
2231, 2236 (1995) (discussing the conflicting constitutional principles that come into
play in public employment law); see generally Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE. L.J. 877 (1962) (criticizing
different tests in this area); Paul Ferris Solomon, Note, The Public Employee's Right
[Vol.79:221
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After much debate on this issue,8 the Supreme Court set
forth a balancing test in Pickering v. Board of Education.9
Under the test, courts must balance "the interests of the
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs . . .,,l
The effect on government efficiency is determined by the possible
disruption to the work environment.11 This test, however, allows
for unacceptable amounts of judicial discretion 12 and causes
inconsistent results by focusing on the wrong factors for
disruption. Two recent decisions in New York, applying the
Pickering balancing test, illustrate these inconsistencies. In
of Free Speech: A Proposal for a Fresh Start, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 449 (1986)
(discussing the possibility of using a new test for public employees and free speech
rights).
8 Government employees' rights in the area of free speech have expanded since
the mid-twentieth century. See Solomon, supra note 7, at 449. Early on, citizens
gave up their constitutional right to free speech once they became a government
employee. As Justice Holmes recognized, a policeman "may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe
v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892). More recently, the Supreme
Court has given government employees substantial First Amendment protection.
See Stephen A. Newman, The Teacher Who Advocated Pedophilia, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 7,
2003, at 2 (stating that modern cases have granted more First Amendment
protection to government employees).
9 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. The court set forth this test, but stated that it
should be used on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 568-69. This test has also gone
through certain important changes. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
Connick stated that the primary question in the Pickering analysis should be
whether the speech is on a matter of public concern. Id. at 149.
10 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
11 See id. at 568-75. Under this test, it is sufficient that the government show a
potential future disruption. Id. The government does not have to show that a
disruption has already occurred. This is mainly because the court wants to make
sure that the adverse action was taken against the employee due to a reasonable
fear of disruption to the work environment and not in retaliation for the speech. Id.;
see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674-75 (1994).
12 See Johnson, supra note 3, at 189 (discussing various scholars' recognition of
the problems inherent in the balancing test). "Justice Black, the Supreme Court's
most fervent opponent of balancing tests, contends that the defects of a balancing
test in constitutional decision making are the potential for judicial abuse of
discretion and the arbitrary fixing of burdens in order to dictate a particular result
in a given case." Id. (citing Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
367 U.S. 1, 164 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431,
444-45 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 145 (1959)); see also
Emerson, supra note 7, at 912 (discussing the inherent problems in an ad hoc
balancing test for constitutional issues).
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Melzer v. Board of Education,13 the Second Circuit held that a
school had the right to terminate a teacher who was a member of
the North American Man Boy Love Association ("NAMBLA"). 14
In doing so, it incorrectly denied a teacher's constitutionally
protected right to speak on a matter of public concern. In
contrast, a federal district court in Locurto v. Giuliani'5
reinstated members of the New York City Police and Fire
Departments after they were fired for committing racially
offensive acts on a parade float.' 6 The court mistakenly decided
that the speech was on a matter of public concern and that the
employees were constitutionally protected in their actions. The
Pickering balancing test caused these inconsistent results and,
therefore, should be refined.
This Comment asserts that a disruption to the work
environment occurs when the public employee's speech would
diminish the government's reputation17 and would be dangerous
to those who are directly affected by the speech.'8 These factors
must be analyzed in light of the position the employee holds in
the workplace 19 and the services performed. 20 The content of the
speech is important only to the extent that it poses a danger to
those directly affected by the speech. 2'
Part I of this Comment discusses the Pickering balancing
test's definition of disruption and how the courts applied it in
Melzer and Locurto. Part II illustrates the problems caused by
the disruption aspect of the test as revealed by the mistaken
13 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1183 (2004).
14 See id.
15 269 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
16 See id.
17 See Melzer, 336 F.3d at 199 (stating that the fact that a school's reputation
may be harmed by the speech is a factor that should be taken into account); see also
Travieso, supra note 4, at 1402 (stating that a police officer's racist speech will
cause the community to distrust the police department and harm its reputation).
18 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388-92 (1987) (implying that a
disruption might be caused by the employees' speech in situations where that
employee is dangerous to the community as a result of that speech).
19 See id. at 390-92 (stating that the speech may cause a disruption depending
on the employee's position in the office).
20 See id. (implying that an employee charged with protecting the community is
more likely to cause a disruption in the work environment when speaking on
matters of public concern).
21 The Supreme Court has stated that the unpopular content of the speech
should not be taken into account when balancing. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 569-70 (1968).
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results in these two decisions. It then discusses how, even if the
test is not changed, Locurto should be reversed in light of the
decision in Melzer. Part III suggests factors that a court should
consider when deciding whether a disruption will occur, in order
to ensure consistent and fair results. It then applies these new
factors to Melzer and Locurto. This Comment concludes with the
proposition that the suggested factors will resolve any
inconsistencies that have resulted from the haphazard
application of the Pickering balancing test.
I. THE PICKERING BALANCING TEST IN PRACTICE
A. Pickering v. Board of Education: Disruption Considered in
Light of Government Effectiveness
In Pickering, the appellant, a public schoolteacher, brought
a suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,22 claiming that his
termination for criticizing school tax proposals in a newspaper
infringed upon his right of free speech. 23 The Court held that his
speech was on a matter of public concern 24 and did not cause a
disruption to the school environment. 25  In doing so, it
constructed a balancing test for questions concerning
government employees' free speech rights.26 The Court stated
that this test should be applied on a case-by-case basis
depending on the facts of each particular situation.2
7
The teacher's termination arose out of a letter he sent to a
newspaper attacking the school board's handling of financial
proposals. 28 The Court stated that there was no evidence that
22 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (allowing citizens to bring an action against state or
municipal officials who deprive them of their constitutional rights).
23 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564-67 (discussing the contents of the letter sent to
the newspaper).
24 See id. at 571-72 (stating that the question of whether a school requires
additional funds is a matter of public concern because it is important to the
interests of the community).
25 Id. at 569-70.
26 "The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of
the teacher, as citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees." Id. at 568.
27 See id. at 569 (stating that the Court did not purport to put down a standard
for all statements but found it necessary to "indicate some of the general lines along
which an analysis of the controlling interests should run").
28 Id. (stating that the letter criticized the school board's handling of the
2005]
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this letter disrupted the school system or the community as a
whole. 29 It held that the speech was not directed at anyone the
appellant would be in contact with and, therefore, would not
cause a disruption to close working relationships. 30 The Court
also stated that there was no evidence that the statements would
impede his job performance. 31 Additionally, it recognized that
teachers are educated about the school board's functions and,
therefore, their speech should not be muzzled. 32 In balancing the
interests of the two parties, the Court concluded that the
teacher's right to speak on this matter of public concern
outweighed the rights of the school board in maintaining an
effective work environment because it was unreasonable to
suspect a disruption would occur in response to the speech. 33
This landmark decision was the first to recognize a public
employee's right to speak on matters of public concern.3 4 It
changed the way courts handled these situations and established
the test used by courts today.35
B. Melzer v. Board of Education: Analysis Under Pickering
In Melzer,36 the Second Circuit, applying the Pickering
Balancing Test, upheld the New York State Board of Education's
decision to terminate a schoolteacher who was a member of
NAMBLA. 37 In doing so, the court misapplied the balancing
allocation of funds between school programs).
29 See id. at 570-71 (recognizing that the letter was considered to be false by
everyone except the Board and therefore it was not detrimental to the school
system).
30 Id. at 569-70.
31 Id. at 570, 572-73.
32 Id. at 572 (discussing that teachers generally have knowledgeable insight
into how to designate funds for school operations).
33 See id. at 572-73.
34 See Anthony F. Newton, Note, Lessons Unlearned: The Supreme Court
Expands the Definition of Public Employee in Board of County Commissioners v.
Umbehr, 35 HOuS. L. REV. 921, 933 (1998) (stating that Pickering is the "seminal
Supreme Court case" in the area of free speech rights for public employees).
35 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564-73; Newton, supra note 34, at 933-35
(explaining the test derived by the Supreme Court in this case).
36 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1183 (2004).
37 Id. at 200. Melzer brought a § 1983 claim alleging that his termination
violated his First Amendment right of free speech. Id. at 188-89. First, the court
noted that Pickering was the correct test to determine whether the termination
violated the First Amendment. Id. at 194. The court concluded that the
government's right to keep the school free from disruption outweighed Melzer's
right to speak on this matter of public concern. Id. at 197-99. The court also held
[Vol.79:221
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test's disruption factor by focusing on the reactions of the
parents and not the students.3
Melzer had been a teacher at Bronx High School of Science
for over thirty years and taught grades nine through twelve.
39
He was an exceptional teacher and mentor.40 He had been a
member of NAMBLA for about twenty years before his
termination.41 NAMBLA's goal is to change the laws governing
the age of consent between men and boys and to abolish certain
laws, such as those involving child pornography.42 Melzer served
in many capacities within the organization, including editor of
NAMBLA's publication, the NAMBLA Bulletin.43 There was no
evidence that Melzer ever engaged in any illegal conduct.
44
that the termination was not in retaliation for Melzer's membership in the group.
Id. at 199-200.
38 See id. at 191-92. The court mostly discussed the parent's reactions to
Melzer's membership in NAMBLA. Id. It devoted one paragraph to the student's
reactions to the membership, noting that their views were on "both sides of the
controversy." Id. at 191. However, the principal claimed that over ninety percent of
the student body was unhappy with Melzer's membership. Id. The court took this
contention as true without any further evaluation. In fact, the previous discussion of
the students' reactions seemed to support the opposite conclusion. Further,
disagreement over one's group membership does not necessarily lead to a
disruption. Just because people disagree with something does not mean a disruption
based on that disagreement must follow. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 605-10 (1967) (stating that members of the Communist party, who made their
views clear to the public, could not be fired from a school just because people
disagreed with their beliefs).
39 Melzer, 336 F.3d at 189. Melzer taught from 1962 until the board suspended
him in 1993, which led to his outright termination in 2000. Id.
40 Id. Not only did Melzer teach in one of the best public high schools in New
York, but the school awarded him with several commendations for his teaching
ability and work with certain groups. Id.
41 Id. He joined NAMBLA in 1979 or 1980 "to discuss with others his long-
standing attraction to young boys." Id. The court described Melzer's membership as
an "outlet" for his desires. Id.
42 See id. The group seeks to establish these goals by educating the public on its
activities and affiliating with other organizations supporting sexual liberation. Id.;
see also Tom Perrotta, Teacher Fired for Affiliation Loses Lawsuit, N.Y. L.J., Feb.
27, 2002, at 1.
43 See Melzer, 336 F.3d at 189. He also occasionally wrote articles for the
publication including one discussing a police officer who posed as a member of the
organization and arrested another member. Another article claimed that the same
policeman mailed copies of the Bulletin to the Board of Education. Id. at 190. Other
articles included Melzer's belief in NAMBLA's stated goals. Id. at 189-90.
44 Id. at 189; see Newman, supra note 8, at 2 (stating that while Melzer's
attraction to young boys made him a pedophile within the dictionary definition, he
never did anything illegal during his thirty years of teaching).
20051
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When Melzer's membership in NAMBLA was brought to the
Board's attention in 1984, no administrative action was taken. 45
An investigation took place nearly seven years later.46 In 1993, a
local television station in New York aired a segment illustrating
Melzer's membership in NAMBLA47 After this dissemination,
and while Melzer was on sabbatical, 48 teachers and school
officials met to decide whether Melzer should be allowed to
return to the school. 49 The court stated that some school officials
expressed trepidation over his return.50 However, it failed to
quantify the number of faculty members expressing these
concerns. 51 The court then discussed the Parents' Association's
angry reactions to the news stories.52 After these reactions, and
after the students held an assembly expressing their views, 53 the
principal decided to suspend Melzer.54 Disciplinary hearings
were held and Melzer was terminated. 55 Melzer then brought a §
45 Melzer, 336 F.3d at 190. An anonymous letter was sent to the school's
principal in 1984 or 1985. Id. When the Board asked Melzer about his membership,
he declined to comment. Id.
46 See id. The investigation began again in 1992 by a newly created
investigative body for the school district. Id.
47 Id. at 190-91. The media aired the story during the investigation. Id. It was
a three-part story discussing schoolteachers who were members of NAMBLA. Other
television stations later aired the story. See id.; see also Perrotta, supra note 42, at 1
(stating that an NBC affiliate aired the story including a tape from a meeting).
48 See Melzer, 336 F.3d at 191 (stating that Melzer was on sabbatical for the
1992-1993 school year).
49 Id. (discussing the fact that the principal met with approximately one
hundred teachers and school officials).
50 Id. The concerns were mainly over whether Melzer should be allowed around
the students and the news story's effect on future student recruitment. Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. (stating that approximately fifty or sixty parents were angered by
Melzer's involvement in the association and threatened to remove their children and
conduct strikes if the Board allowed Melzer to continue teaching there).
53 Id. The court stated that a four hundred-person assembly was conducted,
and of the thirty to forty students who spoke, a majority opposed plaintiffs
involvement while only a few students advocated for his continued employment. Id.
54 Id. The investigation report issued in support of this decision stated that
disruption and loss of parental confidence in the school would follow, and expressed
a concern of future sexual abuse against children. Id. The court did not agree with
the concern for the possibility of future sexual abuse by Melzer. See id. at 198
(stating that since the organization was not acting illegally, an employee can not be
punished for his association with it) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969)).
55 Id. at 192. The hearings concluded that, as a result of the media attention,
disruption would follow and undermine Melzer's ability as a teacher. Id.
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1983 claim against the Board of Education and the district court
held that Melzer's termination was constitutional.
56
The Second Circuit affirmed, despite holding that the First
Amendment protected Melzer's type of speech and association as
a citizen 57 and that the issue of whether the speech was on a
matter of public concern did not need to be decided for the
purposes of the case.58 Next, to decide whether the termination
was unconstitutional, the court balanced the interests of the
Board, as a government employer, in keeping its work
environment free from disruption, and Melzer, as a private
citizen and employee, in speaking on this issue.
59
Melzer's activities, according to the court, needed to be
viewed in light of his position at the school and his daily contact
with students. 60 The court disregarded Melzer's claim that,
because it did not show the number of students and teachers
who were unhappy with his participation, the school failed to
fulfill its burden of proving disruption. 61 Instead, the court
concluded that because the parents and students had negative
reactions to the speech, the Board's fear of disruption was
reasonable. 62  It then decided that Melzer's continued
employment at the school would negatively impact the learning
56 See id.
57 Id. The court recognized that the First Amendment would protect the speech
if a private citizen were involved; it then moved on to the Pickering analysis because
Melzer was a government employee. Id.
58 Id. at 192, 197-98 (stating that the second factor of the Pickering analysis
was satisfied since a significant disruption would have followed from the speech,
and therefore the threshold issue of public concern did not need to be determined).
This Comment does not focus on this issue, but it is reasonable to conclude that
lobbying for a change in the law is a matter of public concern. The determination of
this issue would have been crucial had the court balanced the issues correctly and
concluded that a disruption would follow. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146
(1983) (stating that the threshold issue of public concern must be met before
performing the balancing portion of the Pickering test).
59 Melzer, 336 F. 3d at 197.
60 Id. at 198-99 (stating that the determination of whether his speech was
protected would be conducted very differently had Melzer not been a teacher whose
primary functions were to protect and educate children).
61 Id. at 198 (stating that the quantity of school community members who
disapproved of the speech was not relevant, and concluding that the Board's
reasonable view that the majority of the school community was against Melzer's
return was enough to satisfy the balancing test in favor of the government).
62 Id. The court assumed that the negative reactions would result in disruption
without a thorough analysis showing the probability of such an occurrence. Id. at
198-99.
20051
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environment because of "his effect on two critical
constituencies-the students and the parents."6 3  The court
incorrectly stated that a disruption would follow. 64  These
concerns were unfounded in light of the facts of the case.
Melzer's teaching ability was never in question and the presence
of a NAMBLA member in the school should not have led to the
conclusion that the school's reputation would decrease.
C. Locurto v. Giuliani: Decided in the Wake of Pickering
In Locurto v. Giuliani,65 the district court applied the
Pickering balancing test 6 6 and reinstated members of the New
York City Police and Fire Departments after their outrageous
and racist actions on a parade float in Broad Channel, Queens.67
The court held that the speech was protected under the First
Amendment68 and that the public employees' interests in
speaking on this matter of public concern outweighed the
interests of the government in maintaining an effective work
environment free from disruption.69 In fact, the court claimed
that the Mayor and the Commissioners of the NYPD and FDNY
terminated the employees because of the content of their speech
and not because they feared a future disruption to the working
63 Id. at 198-99. The court only focused on the parents' concerns and incorrectly
assumed that the speech would have a negative effect on the students. Id.
6 Id. (stating that Melzer's return could cause parents to remove their children
from the school, impair the school's reputation and the students' learning
environment, and decrease cooperation between parents and teachers).
65 269 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
66 See id. at 383-402.
67 Id. at 402.
68 Id. at 401-02. This article does not contend that the speech would not be
protected under the First Amendment had a private citizen, and not a public
employee, participated in such actions. It should be noted that there is a difference
between constitutionally protected speech and something that comes dangerously
close to a hate crime. Racist conduct has historically caused disruption in work
environments and organizations. Disruptions occur, not only in the form of lack of
trust and respect for officials, but also in the form of violence. Defacing someone's
property with vicious hate symbols is one instance where violence and outrage has
followed. Yet, this type of symbolic speech has been held to be unacceptable. See
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347-48 (2003) (holding that Virginia's ban on cross
burning with the intent to discriminate did not violate the First Amendment). So
why was the speech protected in Locurto? While that speech was not in the form of
defacing property, there is no difference in the prejudiced message sent to the
public. Firing those who commit such acts is constitutional when they hold positions
where violent situations are always a possibility and the protection of every citizen
is the key objective.
69 Locurto, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 398.
[Vol.79:221
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environment. 70 The court mistakenly held against the city and
overlooked the importance of the community's possible reactions
to the speech.71
Joseph Locurto, a New York City police officer, and Robert
Steiner and Jonathan Walters, New York City firefighters,
participated in a number of controversial floats in Broad
Channel's annual Labor Day parades. 72 The float at issue in the
instant case was entitled "Black to the Future: Broad Channel
2098,"73 and displayed racially sensitive content, including
wearing black-face and "Afro" wigs, engaging in chants that
referred to historical civil rights rallies, eating large buckets of
Kentucky Fried Chicken and watermelon, and dressing in a
sloppy manner."74
70 Id. at 391-93. Although courts have continuously stated that the unpopular
content of the speech should not be considered when deciding constitutional
questions under the First Amendment, it does play a role in deciding whether the
speech will cause a disruption in the working environment. It is necessary to take
these opinions into account because some types of speech may cause a disruption in
one working environment and not in another depending on the responsibilities of
the job at issue.
71 This contention focuses on all of the plaintiffs involved in the float and how
their reinstatement could affect the community and the effectiveness of both
departments. Cf. Travieso, supra note 4, at 1377-78.
72 Locurto, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 373. In 1996, the plaintiffs participated in a float
that was entitled "The Gooks of Hazard," which depicted many "disparaging Asian-
American stereotypes," including intentions to mock the group's accent and "nearly-
closed eyes." Id. at 373-74, 374 n.1. In 1997, the plaintiffs participated in a float
entitled "Dysfunctional Family Feud," which depicted the rivalry between the Broad
Channel Volunteer Fire Department and the Broad Channel Athletic Club. Id. at
374. The court noted that the media did not cover these two floats, and that the
floats did not cause any disruption in the departments or the community. Id.
However, the court failed to recognize that there was no disruption because there
was no media coverage and, therefore, not many people were aware of the floats'
existence. Prior to this, the members of the group had participated in many other
discriminatory floats during the Labor Day parade and won prizes for "Funniest
Float" nine years in a row. Id. The plaintiffs participated in the 1996 and 1997
floats, in addition to the float that brought about their termination. Id.
73 Id. at 374. The float was intended to parody the popular 1985 film, Back to
the Future, and depicted what it would be like in Broad Channel if African-
Americans were to become the majority of those living in the community. Id. In the
court's opinion, it also noted that Broad Channel is a predominantly white
neighborhood. Id. at 385; Travieso, supra note 4, at 1380 (stating that only one
percent of the community's residents were non white and there were no African
Americans or Asian Americans listed on the 1990 census).
74 See Locurto, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 374; see also Mark Hamblett, Trial Opens on
City Firings for Racist Float, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 8, 2003, at 1 (discussing the opening of
the trial and the contentions of both parties).
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The most egregious act was plaintiff Walters' vivid depiction
"of the dragging death of James Byrd, Jr. in Jasper, Texas, in
1998."75 This act was repeated after the crowd and a cameraman
urged Walters to do it again. 76 After the float was described as
racist on the news and it was made known that city employees
participated, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani publicly stated that any
city employee involved in this type of racist action would be
fired.77 The respective departments suspended Locurto, Steiner,
and Walters after they admitted to their participation in the
float.78 After their identities were revealed, Mayor Giuliani
again stated that these men would never return to the NYPD or
FDNY, even though at this point they were technically only
suspended.79 Disciplinary hearings took place charging the men
with engaging in conduct that would interfere with the efficiency
of the departments.80  The policeman and firemen were
terminated.81 After their termination, all three brought suit
pursuant to § 1983, claiming that they were terminated "in
retaliation for engaging in offensive speech. '8 2
Judge Sprizzo applied the Pickering balancing test8 3 and
decided that the speech was a matter of public concern because
75 Locurto, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 375; see also Hamblett, supra note 74, at 1 ("Mr.
Walters allegedly grabbed the back of the truck and allowed himself to be dragged
along in reference to the brutal dragging murder of James Byrd Jr. in Jasper,
Texas."). Byrd, an African American man, was dragged behind a truck with a rope
tied around his ankles by three white men. Locurto, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 375.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 376; David W. Chen, Officers and Fireman Wore Blackface on Float,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1998, at Bi (discussing Mayor Giuliani's
reactions and comments after he was informed about the participants of the float).
78 Locurto, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
79 Id. at 377; see also Kit R. Roane, Suspended Officer Apologizes, Calling Float
'a Big Mistake, N.Y. TIMES, September 13, 1998, at 51 (quoting Mayor Giuliani,
who stated that "[t]he only way [Locurto] gets back on the police force is if the
Supreme Court of the United States tells us to put him back").
80 Locurto, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 378. The Deputy Commissioner for Trials for the
NYPD, after hearing the evidence from both sides, recommended that Locurto be
found guilty and Police Commissioner Safir agreed. Id. at 378. An Administrative
Law Judge found Steiner and Walters guilty and recommended that they be fired,
and Fire Commissioner Von Essen abided by this recommendation. Id. at 379.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 First, the court noted that before this case, Pickering had never been applied
to a situation where the speech neither "took place in the workplace [n]or concerned
a subject germane to workplace policy or functioning." Id. at 384 (observing that the
speech in Pickering was aimed at the school and that subsequent cases did not take
place outside the workplace and concluding that, therefore, Locurto was "outside the
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one of the plaintiffs' goals was to comment on the future racial
integration of their community.8 4 The court proceeded to focus
on the timing of the decision to terminate plaintiffs and whether
Mayor Giuliani was primarily responsible for the actual
decision.8 5 The court concluded that the decision to fire plaintiffs
was made before the disciplinary hearings were held8 6 and that
Mayor Giuliani had retaliatory motives for making the decision
to terminate the plaintiffs.8 7
The court next considered whether the defendants' concern
with regard to possible future disruption was reasonable, and if
so, whether they in fact fired plaintiffs for this reason.88 The
paradigmatic fact pattern from which Pickering and its progeny were derived"). It
decided that even though the context of the speech was different in Locurto,
Pickering was still controlling and the "underlying constitutional principles [of
Pickering were] still relevant." Id. at 385.
84 Id. at 386 (stating that race and discrimination issues are inherently matters
of public concern) (citing Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.8 (1983)).
85 Id. at 388 (discussing the defendants' contention that the decision to
terminate the plaintiffs was made after the disciplinary hearings by the
Commissioners as well as the plaintiffs' opposing contention that the decision was
made by Mayor Giuliani before the hearings). This, according to the court, was
important in deciding whether the defendants' belief of a possible future disruption
was the cause of the termination or whether the decision to fire the plaintiffs was in
fact made in retaliation for their disparaging actions. Id. at 388-89 (stating that the
defendants did not terminate plaintiffs because of the possibility of future
disruption to the departments, but rather in retaliation for the speech, based on the
date on which the decision to terminate was made).
86 Id. at 388-389 ("Based on the strength of Mayor Giuliani's contemporaneous
public comments, as well as his testimony at trial and that of the Commissioners,
the Court finds, as a matter of fact, that Mayor Giuliani made a decision to
terminate plaintiffs on or about September 10, 1998.").
87 Id. at 392, 395. After determining that the defendants made the decision to
fire the plaintiffs by September 10, 1998, the court turned to the question of the
defendants' motivation for firing the plaintiffs. Id. at 391. In making its decision,
the court relied heavily on Mayor Giuliani's statements and reaction to the speech
as soon as he found out about the float. Id. at 391-92. The court also emphasized
the fact that Giuliani did not know the identities of the participants and did not ask
anyone in the minority community for possible reactions to the float when making
these comments. Id. at 391. The court then decided that another motivating factor
in firing the plaintiffs was the community's criticism of how Giuliani previously
handled the Million Youth March and other racially motivated misconduct and
controversies by police officers. Id. at 392-95. By taking these factors into account,
the court held that the defendants fired the plaintiffs in retaliation for their actions
and not because they feared a possible future disruption. Id. at 397 (stating that the
court would find the termination was in response to the speech, even despite
evidence offered regarding events after September 10, 1998). The court, however, as
a result of these assertions, could have required the departments to hold new
hearings, instead of relying on First Amendment principles.
88 Id. at 395-98 ("Although substantial weight is given to the government
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court found that the defendants could not demonstrate a
reasonable fear of disruption, relying on its previous conclusion
that the decision was made on September 10, 1998, before any
disciplinary hearings or investigation took place.8 9
Next, the court stated that even if the defendants' belief of
disruption was reasonable, it was not sufficient to outweigh the
plaintiffs' interests in speaking on this matter.90 The court
decided that community outrage was not enough, as a matter of
law, to tip the balance in favor of the defendants. 91 Rather,
internal disruption was necessary to justify the defendants'
actions, and the court concluded that no such disruption
existed.92 External disruption, however, including community
reactions to the speech, was sufficient to cause internal
disruption within the departments. Therefore, the court
mistakenly applied the balancing test by looking only to internal
disruption and not the community's reaction to the speech.
II. PROBLEMS WITH PICKERING'S DEFINITION OF DISRUPTION AS
REVEALED BY MELZER AND LOCURTO
A. Misapplication of Disruption Factor in Melzer
In Melzer, the Second Circuit misapplied the Pickering
balancing test by focusing on parental reactions to Melzer's
employer's predictions of disruption ... such predictions must be reasonable. To
satisfy this burden, the government need only show potential interference, not
actual disruption.") (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994)).
89 Id. at 396 (stating that the defendants did not carry their burden of making a
"substantial showing" that plaintiffs' speech would cause future disruption as of
September 10, 1998).
90 Id. at 397-98. The court concluded that even if the potential disruption was
reasonably suspected, it was insufficient to hold in favor of the government. Id.
91 Id. at 398-400. The court distinguished Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143,
154 (2d Cir. 2002), where it held that a police officer's firing was not in violation of
the First Amendment because he disseminated racist flyers to certain members of
the Nassau County Police Department, by claiming that, whereas the speech in
Pappas was private, the speech in Locurto was "of far greater public concern." Id. at
400. The court held that because the speech was of far greater concern than the
speech in Pappas, the interest of the plaintiff must therefore also be considered to a
greater extent. Locurto, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 400 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 152 (1983)). The court also stated that the claim of possible disruption by the
community was insufficient, speculative and conclusory. Id. at 401.
92 Id. at 398 (stating that the evidence did not show any actual disruption
within the working environment, but to the contrary showed that three firefighters
wanted the plaintiffs to return to the force, including one African American).
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speech. In doing so, it failed to consider the students' and
teachers' reactions at the school. When focusing on possible
future disruption, a court must look at the several factors set
forth in Pickering and the cases that followed. 93 In Pickering,
the Court focused on the reactions of other teachers and
administrators and determined that a disruption did not follow
from the speech on that basis. 94 Therefore, the critical parties
involved in Melzer should have similarly been the students and
teachers, not the parents.95 The students were most affected by
the speech. If they were younger, parental concerns may have
had more weight. These students, however, were in high school
and were able to form their own opinions about Melzer's
affiliation. 96 In fact, they even held an assembly to discuss how
they felt about Melzer's continued employment.97  Their
discussion never once disrupted the school environment and, as
the court noted, they expressed views on both sides of the
controversy. 98 Consequently, when the court focused on the
parents, it incorrectly dismissed the students' reactions.
When deciding whether certain speech is protected, the
unpopular content of the speech should not be taken into
account. 99 While the court claimed to recognize this rule, 100 the
93 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-74 (1968) (describing certain
factors that should be taken into account to decide whether a disruption may follow
controversial speech by a government employee, none of which are alone sufficient
to sanction termination); see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987);
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). These factors included plaintiffs
ineffectiveness as a teacher due to the speech, deterioration of the relationships
between the plaintiffs and his coworkers and supervisors as well as the time, place,
manner and context of the speech. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 565-67; see also John M.
Ryan, Teacher Free Speech in the Public Schools: Just When You Thought it was
Safe to Talk. 67 NEB. L. REV. 695, 713 (1988).
94 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570-71 (holding that there was no reasonable fear
of disruption based on the plaintiffs statements and that it would not affect
relationships with coworkers or with administrators at the school).
95 See id.
96 See generally Nancy Tenney, Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Reality
in Public School Curricula: Untruths About Homosexuality as a Violation of the
First Amendment, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1599, 1624-27 (1995) (discussing students'
first amendment rights to receive information on controversial issues); YOUR
SCHOOL AND THE LAW, July 7, 2000, Vol. 30, No. 13 (discussing parental challenges
to a school board's policy to allow students to learn about evolution by explaining to
them that they should form their own opinions about their biblical beliefs).
97 See Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1183 (2004).
98 Id.
99 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987); Melzer, 336 F.3d at 193;
20051
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
sole basis for its decision was the unpopularity of the speech at
issue. Parental reactions to the speech were in fact brought
about by their disagreement with the group's agenda. 10' This is
unfair to a plaintiff like Melzer who, although a member of
NAMBLA, has never been accused of any crime. 10 2 Melzer was
punished for advocating his opinion simply because it was one
with which the majority of the community disagreed. 103
Another basis for the court's opinion, although only alluded
to in parts of its holding, was the recent controversies involving
illegal pedophile behavior within the school system and the
Catholic Church. 0 4  It was unfair to Melzer that these
controversies influenced the court's decision, because he was not
alleged to have been involved in any such controversy.
Additionally, there was no evidence that Melzer's teaching
abilities were impaired due to his personal life or the speech. 05
To the contrary, the facts indicate that Melzer was an excellent
teacher at the school for many years and even received awards in
Locurto v. Giuliani, 269 F. Supp. 2d 368, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Connick v.
Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 169 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that an employer
cannot fire an employee merely because that employee is expressing an unpopular
viewpoint).
100 Melzer, 336 F.3d at 193.
101 Id. at 191. Parental concern was not over whether Melzer would be able to
teach effectively, but rather over fear as to whether Melzer would subject students
to his views or subject them to illegal conduct. Id. at 189, 191. These possibilities
were unfounded and not sufficient to establish a disruption.
102 Id. at 189.
103 See id. at 199; see also Newman, supra note 8, at 2 (stating that parents
should be risk averse when it comes to the safety of their children). Although
parents' concerns are understandable, a person cannot be fired simply because his
views are unpopular.
104 Newman, supra note 8, at 2 (stating that the basis for parents' mistrust is
not a disagreement with pedophilia in general, but a legitimate fear that their
children will become victims, partly due to many recent cases involving pedophiles
with no self restraint); see also Jeffrey Kluger, The Molesters' Mindset: Why Do They
Target Kids?, TIME, Apr. 1, 2002, at 37 (discussing the thought processes of
pedophiles); Danielle N. Rodier, Diocese, Bishop Are on The Hook in Suit Over
Priest's Molestation of Boy in Motel, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 30, 1999, at 1
(discussing a case where the Court held that the diocese of Altoona and St.
Theresa's Church could be held responsible for a priest's molestation of a young boy
in a hotel room). Because of the recent myriad news reports regarding pedophilia in
the Catholic Church, it can be assumed that this factor played a role, not only in the
decision, but also in parental reactions to Melzer's affiliation.
105 See Melzer, 336 F.3d at 189. At the time of his termination, Melzer had been
a member of NAMBLA for twenty years and his teaching ability had never once
been in question. See id.
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recognition of his ability.106 Moreover, his relationships with
other faculty members would not have been compromised due to
the speech. 10 7 Teachers expressed their concerns, but concerns
are not sufficient to establish a disruption.108  In Pickering,
teachers and administrators expressed concerns about the
plaintiffs continued employment, yet the court held that the fear
of disruption was unreasonable. 109 The sole purpose of this
balancing test is to protect government employees who are
advocating unpopular opinions, so long as those views do not
create a disruption within the work environment. If Melzer's
speech were uncontroversial, termination would never have been
an issue. This is why the fear must be reasonable. Although it
is reasonable to believe that parents would be unhappy with
Melzer's continued employment, it is unreasonable to believe
that a disruption impacting the effectiveness of the school would
result. °10 Therefore, the court erroneously held in favor of the
Board of Education.
B. The Mistaken Rationale in Locurto
The court in Locurto mistakenly concluded that the
termination was in retaliation for the speech and not based on
future disruption. Judge Sprizzo based his erroneous decision on
the fact that Mayor Giuliani terminated the plaintiffs.'11 The
identity of the person who ultimately makes the decision to
106 Id.
107 Id. at 198-99.
10 Cf. Anderson v. Evans, 660 F.2d 153, 159 (6th Cir. 1981) (stating that the
nature of plaintiffs remarks created tension between her and the principal, thereby
making "a normal relationship difficult in a situation where cooperation is
necessary"). In Evans, the teacher's statements were made against African
Americans when the majority of those with whom she worked were minorities,
including the teacher's aide, the principal and students. See id. at 155-57. In
addition, she received unsatisfactory evaluations. Id. at 156. These facts are very
distinguishable from those in Melzer, where there was no evidence that, in the ten
years that the school knew of Melzer's affiliation, his relationships with supervisors
or other teachers were affected. See Melzer, 336 F.3d at 190-91.
109 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 566, 572-73 (1968). Though in
Pickering the speech criticized the employer and other employees, it was found to
not affect working relationships. Since concerns over the continued employment in
Pickering were not enough to establish a disruption, it is logical that they are
likewise insufficient in Melzer.
110 See Ryan, supra note 93, at 715, 717 (stating that the current test employed
by courts impedes criticism and improvement of educational institutions and serves
to fire the most bright and innovative educators).
111 Locurto v. Giuliani, 269 F. Supp. 2d 368, 388-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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terminate an employee is unimportant when determining
whether the employers were motivated by the possibility that a
disruption would occur if employment continued. Irrespective of
whether the Commissioners or Mayor Giuliani made the decision
to terminate the plaintiffs, the decision was based on the fear of
possible future disruption to the effectiveness of both the NYPD
and FDNY. 112 Instead, if the dismissals were in fact retaliatory,
the court could have ordered new hearings to be conducted. The
court erroneously stopped short its analysis. 1 3
Moreover, the plaintiffs in Locurto contended that the
decision to terminate them was motivated by Giuliani's desire to
gain a better reputation in the eyes of the public.11 4 This
contention was based on the fact that there was friction between
the Mayor and certain minority groups after he made several
controversial decisions involving incidents between police
officers and minorities.11 5 This was the wrong focus in deciding
whether the fear of disruption was reasonable. 116 Rather, the
reactions of the departments' members and the citizens of the
neighborhoods where the plaintiffs worked should have been
considered. A reasonable fear of disruption is apparent based on
those interests.
Focusing on the specific jobs at issue, a police officer and
firefighter's sole objective is to protect the community to which
112 See id. at 399-400 (discussing the application of the Pickering test in this
particular case as related to Pappas).
113 See Supplemental Brief in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee's Motion to Dismiss
Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction at 6-8, Locurto v. Giuliani, 269 F. Supp. 2d 368
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 00-7628).
114 Locurto, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (quoting Strong of Heart, the autobiography
of Commissioner Thomas Von Essen, which stated that the Mayor did not like any
incidents that made New York look bad and that he was sensitive to certain views
that Von Essen and members of the police department were racist).
115 Id. at 392-95 (discussing the disruption that occurred over the continued
employment of police officers involved in the shooting death of Amadou Diallo in
1999 and the manner in which the Mayor handled the Million Youth March, which
occurred only a few weeks before the float incident).
116 See Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 144-45, 151 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding
that there was a reasonable suspicion of disruption on the part of the government
after a member of the NYPD sent racist and anti-Semitic pamphlets to members of
the Nassau County police department and therefore the terminated employee's
First Amendment rights were not violated); see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S.
378, 389-92 (1987). In Rankin, the Court held that the plaintiffs speech against
President Reagan was protected because she was not a police officer, did not carry a
weapon, and it was unreasonable to assume a disruption would occur when her
statements were made in private. Id.
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they are assigned. 117 It is reasonable to believe that, because the
plaintiffs worked in racially diverse neighborhoods where many
African Americans lived,118 those citizens would not feel safe if
the plaintiffs continued to work there since the plaintiffs
demonstrated their lack of respect and racist views towards
African Americans." 9 This display of hate would have therefore
caused a disruption within the work environment. 20 In the past
few years, the reputation of police officers, especially in the eyes
of minorities, has come into question. 121 With these perceptions
in mind, Locurto's actions were likely to have a further negative
117 See Pappas, 290 F.3d at 146-47 (stating that police effectiveness is
undermined by racist speech and that when this happens the department is no
longer seen as a protector of the community's interests); see also Rankin, 483 U.S. at
380 (stating that the plaintiff was not a peace officer and thereby suggesting that if
she were, her speech may not have been protected); Travieso, supra note 4, at 1392-
93 (stating that when a police officer's behavior is "racist and prejudiced against
those constituents they are assigned to serve and protect" the officers should not be
afforded protection under the First Amendment). But see Berger v. Battaglia, 779
F.2d 992, 1002 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that an officer's performance in blackface
was constitutionally protected). Berger, however, can be distinguished from Locurto
in that the officer performing in blackface was not performing to mock African
Americans and "made no derogatory or inflammatory remarks." Id. at 993. His
performance was merely an impersonation of singer Al Jolson who historically
performed in blackface. Id.
118 See Locurto, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 375 (stating that the precinct where Locurto
worked was racially diverse and that Walters and Steiner worked in predominantly
African American neighborhoods).
119 See Pappas, 290 F.3d at 146-47 (stating that the police department must
treat all members of the community with respect because otherwise the community
will view it as "oppressor rather than protector" which decreases the ability of the
police to do their job due to a lack of trust between citizens and police); see also
Travieso, supra note 4, at 1395-97.
120 See Pappas, 290 F.3d at 146-47. Further, the community's respect and trust
for the police force impacts the effectiveness of that department and could cause the
type of professional disruption analyzed in the Pickering test.
If the police department treats a segment of the population of any race,
religion, gender, national origin, or sexual preference, etc., with
contempt,... respect for law enforcement is eroded and the ability of the
police to do its work in that community is impaired. Members of the
minority will be less likely to report crimes, to offer testimony as
witnesses, and to rely on the police for their protection.
Id.; see also McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936, 940 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that a
sheriff had a constitutionally protected right to fire an employee who was a member
of the Ku Klux Klan when it became known to the public, because of the group's
violent acts against the community); Travieso, supra note 4, at 1395-97.
121 See Roger Parloff, Conduct Unbecoming, 4 AM. LAW. 88 (May 1999) (stating
that Locurto acted "in a city where minority mistrust of the predominantly white
police department is the hottest of hot-button issues").
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impact on the reputation of New York City police officers. 122 The
same is true for the fire department. 123 In assessing disruption,
a negative effect on reputation is an important factor, especially
with respect to the NYPD and FDNY. 124 If those officials are not
respected, there will be a negative impact on recruitment efforts
and the possibility of civil unrest. 125
In addition, plaintiffs made their racist views towards
African American officers clear through their actions on the
float. 126 It is not unreasonable to believe that tensions would
arise between African American employees and plaintiffs as a
result of their speech. 127 Allowing Locurto to continue working
122 See Pappas, 290 F.3d at 146-47; see also Travieso, supra note 4, at 1396-98.
123 The plaintiffs' actions affected the reputation of both the police and fire
departments and the same disruption factors should be considered for both
departments. See Patricia Hurtado, Judge: No Choice But To Reinstate; May Order
City to Give Jobs Back to Broad Channel 3, NEWSDAY, July 3, 2003, at A08.
124 See Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 199 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1183 (2004) (stating that the fact that a school's reputation may suffer is a
factor to be considered in the analysis of disruption); see also Pappas, 290 F.3d at
148-50 (discussing the reputation of the police department throughout its analysis
of disruption).
125 See Pappas, 290 F.3d at 148-150 (describing possible negative impacts on
the department).
126 Locurto v. Giuliani, 269 F. Supp. 2d 368, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The court
assumed that all African-Americans with whom the plaintiffs worked would support
their reinstatement by noting that one African-American firefighter claimed that
the speech did not bother him. Id. It is unreasonable to make a generalization that
every other African-American firefighter has this same opinion.
127 See Hurtado, supra note 123 (discussing the reaction of Michael Marshall,
the first vice president of the Vulcan Society, an association that represents black
firefighters).
To make fun of anyone who died in that brutal way is outrageous.... The
bottom line is they serve the people of the city of New York, which is
predominantly minority.... I don't see that you could portray someone in
such a manner and then cross the border to Brooklyn and suddenly change
your attitude.
See id. (quoting Michael Marshall); see also Ron Howell, FDNY Urged: No Rehire,
N.Y. NEWSDAY, June 26, 2003, at A05.
Paul Washington, president of the Vulcan Society [and fire captain]
said ... that the fired white firefighters could not be relied on to serve
black New Yorkers. "These guys clearly showed that they shouldn't be
working in black communities when they think it's funny to parody the
death of a black man at the hands of some racists".... Washington said
that, for him, the decision was like adding insult to injury .... The
possibility that Walters or Steiner might become firefighters again is
especially upsetting because the number of black firefighters [in the city] is
so low .... blacks make up less than 3 percent of the roughly 11,500 city
firefighters."
Id. (quoting Paul Washington).
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as a policeman and Walters and Steiner as firemen is not only
dangerous to the community, but also to other employees who
work with the plaintiffs in dangerous situations. Additionally,
the court claimed that the disciplinary hearings were different
from those employed against other police officers involved in
racially motivated misconduct in the past.128 It held that this
fact undermined the contention that the defendants' decisions to
terminate the plaintiffs were motivated by disruption. 129 The
court then recognized that in instances of misconduct and racial
controversy, disruption actually did occur.130 Therefore, the
disruption was not only reasonable, but also probable based on
these past situations.
The NYPD and FDNY both have an interest in keeping their
internal working environment free from disruption. 131 Both also
have interests in keeping the neighborhoods of New York City
safe from harm. 132 Allowing racist members to work in these
departments undermines both of these interests. Plaintiffs were
officers and representatives of the city, wore uniforms, and
Locurto was permitted to make arrests and carry a gun.
133
Although their statements were made away from the
workplace,134  they interfered with plaintiffs' possible job
performance and relationships among members of their
departments. 35 Plaintiffs also made these racist statements in
front of a large group of people 36 and the public became aware,
128 See Locurto, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 392-93 (discussing the hearings of the
NYPD in past situations of racially motivated misconduct).
129 Id.
130 Id. at 392-94 (discussing the disruption that occurred after the shooting
death of Amadou Diallo when the police officers were reinstated, and the disruption
after the Million Youth March).
131 See Travieso, supra note 4, at 1393 (recognizing that "the unique position
that police officers occupy in the community requires that police officers enjoy a
lower level of free speech protection than other state employees such as teachers,
postal workers, and toll booth collectors"). Disruption in a police department not
only causes an annoyance for the employer, it also causes a possibility of serious
danger to the community. This affects internal operations because the police will no
longer be able to perform their job effectively.
132 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
133 The Court has held that these factors should be taken into account when the
speech of an employee of a law enforcement agency is in question. Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390-92 (1987).
134 Locurto, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 374.
135 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
136 Not only did plaintiffs perform in front of a large crowd at a parade, but they
also performed for video cameras that broadcasted their actions the following day
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very quickly, that they were public servants. 13 7 When police
officers and firefighters disseminate racist views, it "tends to
promote the view among New York's citizenry that those are
[also] the opinions of [all of] New York's police officers" 138 and
firemen. The court should have realized that community
reactions would cause internal disruption. These reactions, even
though external in nature, also affect the internal operation of
the enterprise.
The court made a comparison to a situation where policemen
and firemen attend religious functions that people disagree
with. 139 However, a police officer with a certain religious
background is different from one who purposefully speaks out
and offends people. This is true because those practicing a
certain religion are not directly insulting members of the
community; they are merely lawfully exercising their freedom of
religion. The court also mistakenly made an analogy to a case
where the Supreme Court held for a black student who was
advocating against segregation at a time when most found this
speech to be offensive, 40 even though in that case, hate speech
was not the issue and neither a policeman nor a fireman was
involved. 141
Moreover, the court focused on Mayor Giuliani's reactions to
the speech throughout its opinion. 142 By continuously referring
to the way he handled situations in the past and how he
terminated plaintiffs to further his political reputation and that
all over the country. See Parloff, supra note 121, at 88.
137 See id.; see also Locurto, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
138 See Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that
racist views by police officers diminish their capacity to effectively perform their
duties, which results in the community's disrespect for those officers).
139 See Locurto, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 400 (citing Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d
1557, 1567 (10th Cir. 1989)).
140 See id. at 401 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965)).
141 See id. at 401-02. Where hate speech is involved a different standard should
be invoked. While free speech is a fundamental right that all citizens enjoy, racially
offensive speech by members of law enforcement agencies can in no way be
compared to a black student advocating equal rights at a time when injustice was
prevalent. In addition, a different standard is invoked when a government employee
is at issue. Therefore, this analogy cannot be made based on constitutional
principles alone.
142 See id. at 376-77. Mayor Giuliani's statements were understandable after
he discovered the horrible racist actions of his employees. Regardless of this fact,
those comments should not have been the basis of the court's opinion. The court
should have focused on the actual speech and its effect on the working environment
and neighborhoods, not Giuliani's reactions.
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of the NYPD and FDNY, 143 the court appeared to be criticizing
Mayor Giuliani's political agenda. 144 This led to the wrong
conclusion. Instead of holding against the defendants because it
believed the hearings were a sham, the court could have simply
ordered the departments to hold new hearings against the
plaintiffs. It then could have decided the First Amendment issue
under the balancing test.
C. Basis for Locurto's Reversal: Melzer's Mistaken Result
Although both cases ended in the incorrect conclusion,
Melzer's mistaken application can be used as a basis for
Locurto's reversal. First, Melzer's consideration of the parents'
reactions is relevant with respect to Locurto.145  Parental
reactions were taken into account due to their participation in
the school community. 46  In Locurto, the reactions of the
members of the community should, therefore, also have been
important considerations.
In addition, the Second Circuit held that the Board's
decision needed to be viewed in light of Melzer's position at the
school and his daily contact with children. 47  In Locurto,
therefore, the plaintiffs' positions as public servants and
protectors, and their daily contact with the community, also
needed to be considered. This, in fact, was a major consideration
in Melzer because the parents were worried that a teacher with
143 See id. at 391-95. Mayor Giuliani's concerns about the reputation of the
Departments were reasonable and therefore whether he was also worried about his
own reputation was not an issue. The reputations of the departments would have
been affected by the speech and that is what substantiates a finding of disruption.
See Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 199 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1183 (2004) (stating that reputation should be taken into account when deciding
disruption).
144 See Locurto, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 391-95 (discussing how Giuliani handled
situations in the past and how after those situations he was not respected by some
people in the community).
145 See Melzer, 336 F.3d at 191. While taking the parental reactions into
consideration was incorrect in Melzer, the court's rationale for doing so may at least
be beneficial to bring about the correct result in Locurto.
146 Id. (discussing the school community's reactions to the speech and how that
would affect the working environment). The disruption caused by the parents'
reactions in Melzer, if they in fact caused a disruption, was external in nature
because the parents were not directly involved with the school. Therefore, the
court's decision to only consider internal disruption in Locurto can no longer be
sustained if Melzer is to be considered good law.
147 See id. at 198.
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unpopular beliefs would be a threat to the students.148 The
plaintiffs in Locurto were also a threat to the community and
were placed in dangerous situations on a daily basis by virtue of
being police and fire personnel.
Moreover, the Melzer court found that the number of
teachers who opposed Melzer's continued employment was
irrelevant.149 Therefore, in Locurto, the fact that two African-
American firemen did not oppose plaintiffs' continued
employment is also irrelevant for two reasons. First, only two
African American firemen gave their opinions. 150 Second, in
Melzer, the court simply accepted the government's estimation of
the number of people in the school community who were
concerned over Melzer's affiliation. 151 Therefore, the Locurto
court could also have accepted Mayor Giuliani's concerns, as well
as the Commissioners' statements. They knew how the
community reacted to racial misconduct in the past and,
therefore, could assess how those parties would react as a result
of plaintiffs' speech. 152
Additionally, in Melzer the court stated that the reputation
of the school was a factor in its decision-therefore, reputation
should also play a role in Locurto.153 There is no doubt that the
reputation of the police and fire departments would be harmed
due to the racist speech involved in Locurto. The people of the
community will continue to believe that those are the views of
the entire NYPD and FDNY.
148 Id. at 199 (stating that a disruption could occur from the simple act of
impressing controversial views upon young children).
149 Id. at 191. The court concluded that many teachers expressed concerns
about Melzer's speech. It did not say how many opposed his continued employment
and just assumed that a disruption would occur from those concerns. Id.
150 Locurto v. Giuliani, 269 F. Supp. 2d 368, 378-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The
firemen stated that they would not have a problem with Walters and Steiner
returning to the fire department. Id. But see supra note 127.
151 Melzer, 336 F.3d at 191. The court accepted the principal's assumption that
a majority of the school community would be concerned over the speech and
therefore a disruption would follow. Id.
152 The mayor was well aware of the tensions between the police department
and the community. These tensions had caused a disruption in the work
environment in the past. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
153 Melzer, 336 F.3d at 199. The court concluded that reputation is a factor to be
considered. It stated that, although it is not a deciding factor, it should be
considered in light of all other circumstances. Id. If this is true, then the court in
Locurto mistakenly held that Giuliani was wrong for being conscientious about the
decline in reputation of the police and fire departments.
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In addition, the court's conclusion in Melzer, that simple
concerns over the speech would cause a disruption, supports a
reversal of Locurto.154  In Locurto, many people in the
community stated their concerns over whether these men would
be fit for duty. 15 5 Also, if Melzer's teaching ability would suffer
as a result of his speech because he could have impressed his
views upon the children, 156 plaintiffs' speech in Locurto also
affected their ability as members of the NYPD and FDNY
because they could have inflicted their racist views on other
members of the departments.
In conclusion, if Melzer's speech was not protected, the
speech in Locurto certainly serves as a basis for plaintiffs'
termination. Moreover, Locurto should be reversed either by
applying Pickering correctly or by using Melzer's mistaken
application.
III. RECONFIGURING DISRUPTION UNDER THE PICKERING
BALANCING TEST
As illustrated by Melzer and Locurto, the Pickering
Balancing Test, when deciding whether certain speech by
government employees is protected under the First Amendment,
leaves room for judicial discretion. 157 Unfortunately, when this
154 Id. at 191. The court's emphasis on the "concerns" of the parents and
teachers at the school was enough to substantiate a finding of disruption. If this is
so, then the court in Locurto should not have concluded that the concerns of the
Commissioners and members of the community were not enough to establish
disruption.
155 See Travieso, supra note 4, at 1381, 1399-1400.
156 Melzer, 336 F.3d at 199 (stating that "it is perfectly reasonable to predict
that parents will fear [Melzer's] influence and predilections").
157 See generally Melzer, 336 F.3d 185 (granting a government employer the
right to fire a teacher who was a member of NAMBLA because parents did not agree
with the organization's views); Locurto v. Giuliani, 269 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (applying the Pickering test to grant First Amendment freedom to those in a
public servant capacity who make racist statements against citizens they are hired
to protect). In Ferrara v. Mills, the court held that a teacher who criticized a school's
use of certain types of registration and teaching assignments was not protected
under the First Amendment. 781 F.2d 1508, 1515-16 (11th Cir. 1986). "The public
educator's ... lesson from the Ferrara decision is that the court has great latitude in
applying a balancing test to determine the educator's first amendment interests."
Johnson, supra note 3, at 188. Although the Court in Pickering attempted to limit
the applicability of the test by stating that the court did not purport to set down a
general rule by which all statements should be judged, many cases with a variety of
fact situations used the test, resulting in conflicting opinions limiting government
employees' First Amendment rights. Id. at 188-89 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,
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type of issue is involved, political opinions take precedence in
judicial decision-making and can unfairly shape the outcome of
an opinion.'58 This leaves room for ambiguity and inconsistent
results, 159 to the point where government employees may no
longer feel safe speaking publicly about controversial issues,
fearful that it will ultimately result in their termination.160
This type of decision-making, under the veil of the First
Amendment, is a flagrant departure from constitutional
principles of fairness and freedom. 161 There are some instances
where government employees must be cautious of what they say,
as in Locurto, and others where employees need to speak on
matters that, although controversial, furnish an open debate. 62
The Pickering balancing test purports to guide judges in making
this decision. 63 It has failed in this task 64 and must be refined.
391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968)).
158 See Melzer, 336 F.3d at 191 (focusing on how parents would handle Melzer's
reinstatement); Locurto, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 391-95 (criticizing Mayor Giuliani's
political agenda and using this criticism to justify reinstatement of police and fire
department members; see also Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 859, 864-66 (N.D.
Ga. 1993) (holding against a lesbian who told co-workers that she was getting
married to her girlfriend, concluding that the speech was not on a matter of public
concern and that, even if it were, it would not be protected because the interests of
the employer in advocating against gay marriage outweighed plaintiffs interest in
speaking as private citizen); Ferrara, 781 F.2d at 1515-16 (deciding that a teacher's
comments on registration policies within the school were nothing but gripes against
administrators and therefore were not protected under the First Amendment).
159 See Johnson, supra note 3, at 188-89 (stating that the Ferrara decision was
an example of the "unpredictable manner in which the balancing test is applied to
first amendment claims"); see also Emerson, supra note 7, at 914 (stating that
"when examined in the light of... elements essential to a system of freedom of
expression [an] ad hoc balancing test is, as a legal theory of reconciliation, illusory").
160 See generally Solomon, supra note 7 (discussing the inconsistencies caused
by the balancing test and attributing its unpredictability to the lower federal courts'
difficulties in applying the test). "[T]he decisions in this area are often times
irreconcilable." Id. at 449.
161 See Emerson, supra note 7, at 912 (stating that the balancing test frames
issues in "such a broad and undefined way... that it can hardly be described as a
rule of law at all").
162 See Allred, supra note 1, at 429 ("The Court has ... recognized that each
instance of restricting free speech is necessarily a question of degree, ever mindful
of the danger of suppressing speech that should be heard.") (footnotes omitted).
163 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) (stating that their
opinion needs to be viewed in light of the fact that the freedom to speak on
controversial issues is important to facilitate public debate).
164 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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The test's main defect is in the factors it uses to determine
whether a disruption may occur. 165 Generally, every time a
balancing test is used, judges are inevitably given the power to
decide whose interests have more weight. 166 Where the factors
involved are ambiguous and arbitrarily set, 67 inconsistent
results become probable. 168 In light of these inconsistencies, the
test must be refined in the area of disruption. By refining the
factors currently used by the test in order to reach a new
definition of disruption, these conflicting results will be
minimized.
A. Factors That Should be Considered Under the Test
Certain factors should be considered when deciding whether
a disruption will occur as a result of an employee's speech. A
decline in reputation can cause a disruption in certain contexts,
and therefore the first factor considers the effect the speech will
have on the credibility of the employer.1 69 The second factor
targets the parties who are directly affected by the speech and
then considers their reactions. The third and fourth factors are
those already considered within the balancing test: whether the
speech will affect working relationships; 70 and the context, form
165 Solomon, supra note 7, at 459-69 (stating that even though Connick
purported to fix the test, it in fact did nothing to clear up its ambiguities).
166 See id. at 464-69 (arguing that the balancing test used in Connick will lead
to inconsistent results). In all cases using the Pickering Balancing Test, courts must
decide which interests are more important. This is why set factors need to be
incorporated in order to move toward uniformity and lessen the possibility of
judicial abuse of discretion.
167 See Johnson, supra note 3, at 189 (stating that Justice Black contends that
when a balancing test is used, the inevitable result is that judges will arbitrarily fix
borders in order to ultimately end with a particular result).
168 See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
169 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 389 (1987); Melzer, 336 F.3d at 199
(including in its application the effect the speech may have on the ranking of the
school as compared to other competitive schools in the area); Pappas v. Giuliani, 290
F.3d 143, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing the effect that reputation has on the
effectiveness of the city's police department-especially in the eyes of the citizens of
the neighborhoods it protects). The reputation factor must be viewed in the context
of the type of services the office or department provides. In some instances,
reputation may have no impact on the effectiveness of the work environment
depending on its interaction with the community. It also must be viewed in light of
the type of work the employee provides. A clerical worker employed by the NYPD
who expresses racist views does not interact with the community and therefore will
not affect the reputation of the police department. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390-92.
170 The working relationships under the original test have to be considered
"close." A disruption will only occur if the employees are working together on a
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and manner of the speech. 171 The fifth factor is whether there is
actual evidence to show a decrease in the effectiveness of the
employee's performance. 172 The final and most important factor
considers whether the employee will be dangerous to those
directly affected by the speech, because fear of that danger will
cause a disruption in the work environment. 173
B. The Correct Result in Both Cases if Disruption Had Been
Reformulated According to the Proposed Analysis
1. Application to Melzer
When applying this refined test to Melzer, the correct
decision becomes apparent. The impact of the first factor,
whether Melzer's affiliation and speech will affect the reputation
of the school, seems obvious. Melzer was an excellent teacher.
He received commendations for his work. Disciplinary action
was never taken against him with regard to his work ethic or
work product. The school itself is one of the best public schools
in the city. 74 It is unreasonable to conclude that recruitment
efforts based on one teacher's affiliation with a lobbying group
would decrease. A school's reputation is based on the caliber of
its students and teachers. 175 Melzer's speech did not affect his
consistent basis. If they are only working together sporadically, a decline in work
product will not be an issue and therefore effectiveness will not be harmed. See
Anderson v. Evans, 660 F.2d 153, 159 (6th Cir. 1981) (stating that because the
teacher and her African American principal were in a close working relationship,
her racist statements affected their relationship and therefore contributed to the
ineffectiveness of the working environment).
171 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (stating that the context,
manner and form of the speech are important when balancing the interests of the
parties).
172 See Evans, 660 F.2d at 159 (using poor evaluations and her inability to work
with a teacher's aide as evidence that plaintiffs effectiveness as a teacher
decreased); see also Pappas, 290 F.3d at 146-47 (stating that police officers'
effectiveness at their job will decrease because of their racist actions); cf. Rankin,
483 U.S. at 390-92 (stating that because plaintiff was just a clerical worker who did
not interact with the community her effectiveness at the job did not decrease).
173 See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 389.
174 See Advocates for Children, School Profile: H.S. 445 Bronx High School of
Science (stating that the Bronx High School of Science is "one of the most celebrated
schools in the nation" and has won many awards for its accomplishments), at




ability as a teacher or the way the students would perform.
Therefore, the reputation of the school was not in jeopardy.
The second factor focuses on the relevant parties affected by
the speech. Only those who are directly affected by the speech
are important when analyzing this factor. Here, that party was
the students. Their reactions to the speech, if negative, would
cause a disruption within the school. They are in fact the
recipients of Melzer's teaching ability. They expressed their
views in an assembly where they came out on "both sides of the
controversy." 176 The principal claimed that over ninety percent
of the student body expressed concerns, but concerns do not
necessarily cause a disruption. A disruption would be caused by
outright student opposition based on concerns about the
effectiveness of their learning environment. There was no
evidence that this was the case. 177 Moreover, reactions by other
teachers may also be considered, but secondarily to those of the
students. The reactions by other teachers should be considered
only to the extent that they felt his continued employment would
be detrimental to their ability as teachers or to the students'
performance at the school. Outside parties who are not directly
affected by the speech are of no concern, and thus parental
reactions should not be taken into account. 178 Therefore, this
factor did not establish a sufficient disruption in Melzer.
The third and fourth factors were considered in the opinion,
but were misapplied. 179 The speech did not affect working
relationships between the plaintiff and other faculty members
because the speech was not directed at them.180 The teachers'
disagreement with the speech is also irrelevant because it was
based on the speech's unpopular context, and therefore has no
effect on disruption.
176 Melzer, 336 F.3d at 191.
177 See id.
178 In Melzer, the parents were not directly affected by the speech, but the
students were. In Locurto, the community was directly affected by the speech. These
differences explain why the parents' reactions in Melzer should not be taken into
account, but the neighborhood reactions in Locurto should be considered. But see id.
at 199.
179 See id. at 197-98.
180 A work relationship between teachers will be affected to the extent that the
speech was directed at those teachers. See Anderson v. Evans, 660 F.2d 153, 159
(6th Cir. 1981) (stating that because the speech was directed at the principal and
other teachers, work relationships were negatively affected).
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Additionally, based on the context, time and manner of the
speech, it would not have caused a disruption. Melzer expressed
his views away from the school in private meetings held by a
group he was affiliated with.18' Therefore, this factor is not
sufficient to hold that a disruption would occur.
In addition, there was no evidence that Melzer's teaching
ability would have been affected. He was a member of NAMBLA
for twenty years while working at the school and received
commendations for his work. 8 2 He never attempted to impress
his opinions upon students. 8 3 He taught in one of the best high
schools in the city. 8 4  His qualifications were obviously
impeccable.
Moreover, he posed no danger to those for whom or with
whom he worked. 8 5 His views may have been controversial, but
there were never any allegations of illegal conduct. 8 6 This,
considered with all of the other factors, proves that Melzer's
continued employment would not cause a disruption at the
school sufficient to justify infringing upon his First Amendment
rights.
2. Application to Locurto
In Locurto, the credibility of the NYPD and FDNY was
diminished because of the hateful speech and actions at issue.
The speech was directed at members of the neighborhood that
the plaintiffs were employed to protect. The citizens' negative
opinions about the departments seriously undermine the
effectiveness of the NYPD and FDNY in performing their job. 8 7
The communities' trust in the members of the police and fire
departments is essential to the performance of their duties as
protectors. If the community does not trust them, their
effectiveness declines because they are unable to perform their
181 Melzer, 336 F.3d at 194.
182 Id. at 189.
183 See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
184 See supra note 174.
185 See Weighing a Teacher's Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1993, at 22 (stating
that although a parent may not want a person like Melzer working in a school,
"there is a big problem with current efforts to remove Mr. Melzer" because "[t]here
is no evidence whatever that he poses any danger, sexual or otherwise, to his
students").
186 See id. (stating that Melzer was never charged with violating the law).
187 See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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duties as public servants.188 This decline in effectiveness, in
turn, causes a disruption in their work environment.
The relevant parties to be considered are the residents of the
neighborhoods where the plaintiffs worked and the other
members of the police and fire departments. Trust is again an
essential element of working relationships. The speech was
directed at the members of the community, as well as other
African-American members of the police and fire departments.
If these groups do not trust those who are employed to protect
them, then the relationship will not operate effectively.
The third and fourth factors were again misapplied in the
Locurto decision. Working relationships are especially
important here.18 9  In professions such as these, where
dangerous situations are inevitably present, trust and respect
are essential. Members must work together in order to
effectively ensure the safety of those communities. In both
departments, it is impossible to assume that other officers and
firemen will be able to work closely with the plaintiffs after
knowing their viewpoints. 190  This allows for dangerous
situations to become even more prevalent.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs sought to make their views
known to the public by performing these acts on a parade float.
Even though this performance was conducted away from the
work environment, the manner and time in which it was
performed was horrific. The context of their speech was not only
controversial, but also racist and hateful.
In addition, the plaintiffs' speech dangerously affected
members of the community. 191 Locurto wore a uniform, carried a
gun, and was in daily contact with people whom he apparently
hated and disrespected. The two firemen also wore uniforms,
were in daily contact with the community, and were in charge of
protecting people's lives.1 92 Their views were dangerous to the
188 See id.
189 See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 126-27. It may be argued that members of the department
would be able to ignore this speech to serve the public good. However, this is not
only unlikely, it is also unreasonable because of the situations they are placed in on
a daily basis. It is probable that officers would be worried about how their "partner"
will react to these situations based on his or her beliefs.
191 See supra notes 4-5, 18 and accompanying text.
192 These factors have been deemed relevant when the speech of a law
enforcement agency employee is at issue. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,
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communities and to the officers they worked with. There is a
difference between free speech and something that comes
dangerously close to a hate crime, such as the defacing of a
synagogue with a swastika or cross burning. There is no
difference, however, between the plaintiffs' speech and hate
crimes. Both are forms of hate speech and place the public in
danger. If viewed in this light, it is impossible to say that a
disruption would not occur, especially because in these instances
disruption occurs in the form of violence. These factors taken
together would cause a disruption sufficient to conclude that the
First Amendment did not protect the plaintiffs' speech.
CONCLUSION
Until the Supreme Court refines the disruption factor of the
Pickering Balancing Test, courts will continue to produce
inconsistent results in free speech cases involving government
employees. The haphazard application of this test in Melzer and
Locurto substantiates this finding. Moreover, regardless of
whether the Court decides to revamp this test, Locurto must be
reversed on appeal in light of Melzer.
While it seems unacceptable to allow a member of an
organization that advocates sex with young boys to be a
schoolteacher, firing him for this reason goes against
constitutional principles of fairness and freedom. And, although
this same standard applies to members of the police and fire
departments, it does not pertain to officers who place their
communities and coworkers in serious danger. For a
government employee, there is a difference between
constitutionally protected speech and speech that is hateful and
dangerous. Therefore, the courts desperately need to produce a
workable test for questions of free speech and government
effectiveness that takes these types of situations into account.
This Comment aspires to provide a framework for developing
such a test.
380, 390-91 (1987).
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